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NORMS OF COMMUNICATION AND COMMODIFICATION 
WENDY J. GORDONt 
INTRODUCTION 
Around the laws that regulate information and communication 
swarm a host of related nonlegal norms: norms of secrecy, 
confidentiality, and privacy; of anonymity, source-identity, and 
citation; of quotation, paraphrase, and hyperbole; norms of free 
copying and norms of obtaining permission; norms of gossip and of 
blackmail. The articles by Saul Levmore1 and Richard McAdams2 
provide useful windows on some of the ways these laws and norms 
interact. The two articles also provide insight into the comparative 
advantage possessed in some circumstances by law and by nonlegal 
norms, respectively, when information and communication are at 
issue. In my brief Comment I will discuss these two articles, and 
some relevant issues of commensurability and commodification. 
Levmore's concern is with one particular set of tools: anonym-
ity, source-disclosure, and intermediation. These tools appear in 
both legal and social settings, and are governed by different norms 
in each. Levmore tracks their variants and examines how deploy-
ment of these tools can assist in the enforcement of yet other norms 
(as, for example, anonymous teacher evaluations are administered 
in the hope of encouraging professors to adhere to norms of high 
teaching quality).3 McAdams's article also examines group norms. 
It focuses on how the enforcement, articulation, and reformation of 
group norms can be affected by laws that criminalize blackmail. 
McAdams's overall concern is to examine what attitudes our law 
generally evidences toward group norms. 
Most of the Symposium's participants refer to the enforcers of 
nonlegal norms as the "village gossips." Calling something a village 
is roughly equivalent to identifying it as a community characterized 
t Professor of Law and PaulJ. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University School 
of Law. Copyright© 1996 by Wendy J. Gordon. Thanks are owed to Sam Postbrief, 
my in-house sociology expert and polymath. I also extend thanks to Richard 
McAdams, from whom I have learned much despite our continuing disagreement on 
the issues, and to Eric Blumensen, Bob Bone, and Rob Greenberg. 
1 See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191 (1996). 
2 See Richard H. McAdams, GroupNonns, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2237 (1996). 
s See Levmore, supra note 1, at 2203-06. 
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by repeated interaction, shared information, availability of mutual 
sanction, and like considerations. If one dispenses with any 
requirement of geographical propinquity, the writers and readers of 
this Symposium are members of one such "village." One of the 
norms that determines our behavior is the unspoken consensus on 
what kinds of questions belong on the academic agenda. And until 
recently, nonlegal norms remained outside of most lawyers' 
scholarship. 
Our growing inquiry into norms may betoken a new egalitarian-
ism and openness to concerns of noncentralized authority, and 
certainly has called forth much intriguing scholarship, such as the 
contributions by Professors Levmore and McAdams discussed below. 
Yet our usual methodologies might require significant adaptation if 
they are to succeed in this new arena. Levmore's article is concep-
tually straightforward and will teach any reader a great deal; 
McAdams's article-though it contains as many wonderful nuggets 
as does Levmore's-is in the end unpersuasive, because of its 
intricate attempts to construct an exhaustive analysis upon a largely 
speculative base. 
I. LEVMORE ON ANONYMITY 
Levmore's article discusses the norms governing anonymity, and 
how these norms mediate between sometimes conflicting societal 
goals. The goals Levmore has in mind are primarily the following: 
increasing the quantity of information; increasing the reliability, and 
thereby improving the quality, of information; and protecting the 
feelings of, and the relationships among, a speaker, a recipient of 
information, and third parties. One of Levmore's themes is the 
potential to improve the yields, on all these very different scales, by 
combining anonymity with the use of an intermediary-such as a 
publisher who distributes a pseudonymous novel or a policeman to 
whom an informant desiring anonymity supplies a tip. The 
intermediary keeps the name secret, but acts as a filter to provide 
the audience some assurances about the quality of the information 
supplied. 
Levmore further examines whether the set of social anonymity 
norm~4 has anything to teach lawmakers about how to structure 
4 I use "anonymity norms" as shorthand to embrace both norms that recommend 
anonymity and norms that recommend its alternatives, such as full disclosure and 
intermediation. 
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anonymity rules within the law itself. In particular, he discusses the 
current rule that allows individual jurors to be polled. This rule 
aims at discouraging corruption by eliminating the possibility that 
a juror may keep her vote anonymous. This practice of post-trial 
jury polling, however, has a danger; in order to avoid adverse 
comments from friends and community members once the trial is 
over, some jurors may vote contrary to their actual but unpopular 
convictions. Levmore admits that this harm, potentially resulting 
from disclosure of juror names and votes, may be less damaging to 
the polity than the kind of corruption that jury anonymity might 
invite. But Levmore suggests that any such bipolar choice between 
full disclosure and anonymity is unnecessarily restrictive. 
It is at least conceptually possible, he points out, for the judge 
to act as an intermediary. Under such a revised practice, individual 
juror votes could be disclosed to the judge; the judge could then be 
given the discretion "to disclose which juror cast which vote, but only 
upon a showing that evidence of jury tampering existed and 
warranted investigation. 
But this intermediary solution is not used in the jury-polling 
context. One of Levmore's descriptive contentions is that the law 
uses intermediaries less often and less effectively than do social 
actors. Sometimes, as he points out, the intermediary solution is 
simply not physically available,5 but often there is no clear reason 
why the legal system is reluctant to embrace the intermediary route. 
Part of the puzzle Levmore poses to the reader-and leaves for 
further research-is why the law might prefer a bipolar approach 
between anonymity and full disclosure. 
Levmore is also concerned with the limits and abuses of the 
intermediary's role. Mµch more, however, could be done on that 
tack. For example, consider the very question Levmore poses, as to 
why the law supposedly does not use intermediaries as much as 
social actors do. One answer might be that legal intermediaries 
have power and privileges that largely immunize them from scrutiny. 
Consider, for example, how long it took for police brutality to 
become an available and common form of lawsuit, and how many 
tort privileges still remain attached to governmental actors. By 
contrast, social intermediaries are individually chosen, case-by-case, 
by the participants themselves, so that only those meriting trust will 
be likely to receive it, and any abuses will be societally rebuked. 
5 See Levmore, supra note 1, at 2216-18. 
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Thus, it may be the question of "who watches the watchers"-the 
need for some entity to restrain and discipline the intermediaries-
that militates against the law using intermediaries more often. 
Levmore hints at this, 6 but the potential for abuse by intermediaries 
warrants more discussion. 
In addition, the reader may not be persuaded by Levmore's 
descriptive claim that the law is much more reluctant to use 
intermediaries than are social actors, and that the law is bound to 
binary choices, in particular, the yes/no of either full disclosure or 
anonymity. In fact, the law often uses intermediaries. 
For example, the grand jury, with its sharp confidentiality 
restrictions, can be seen as exactly the kind of intermediary 
Levmore has in mind: all sorts of unsorted evidence are brought to 
the intermediary (the grand jury) to be sifted and evaluated; if the 
intermediary finds the evidence sufficiently persuasive, it issues an 
indictment. The indictment does not name all the evidence pre-
senters-that is, it preserves their anonymity-but makes use of the 
information they present, precisely as social intermediaries often 
do.7 
Levmore himself gives other examples where the law does use 
intermediaries, but ordinarily dismisses them as the exception that 
proves the rule. 8 Many readers will see them instead as tending to 
refute the rule. Thus, a reader might come away from the article 
doubting Levmore's description of the law as predominantly 
confined to a binary choice between anonymity and full disclosure. 
Nevertheless, those same readers will have been delighted by 
Levmore's exploration of compl~x territory, and intrigued by his 
implicit suggestion that the current rules on post-trial jury polling 
could be improved by the use of the judge as an intermediary. 
One of the many virtues of Levmore's article is the maturity of 
his style.9 Just as economics becomes more realistic as it ventures 
6 See, e.g., id. at 2231 (noting that with government intermediaries, "there is always 
the question of entrapment"). 
7 In fact, the law here is so eager to provide an intermediary that it sometimes 
ignores the damage that the intermediation can do: because grand jury proceedings 
are secret, a person called to testify has no way to prove to her (perhaps) well-armed 
criminal associates that she did not inform on them. 
8 Levmore mentions the grand jury's use of jury-poll anonymity, see Levmore, 
supra note 1, at 2217 n.42, but not that institution's role as an intermediary. 
9 Given that our topic is communication norms, it should be noted that one thing 
that makes ideas and information circulate is enjoyment. To quote Jim Lindgren, 
"Style matters." James Lindgren, Style Matters: A Review Essay on Legal Writing, 92 
YALE LJ. 161 (1982) (book review). In a law review article, enjoyment requires clear 
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out into societally softer territory like that of norms, 10 Levmore's 
article has a wonderfully novelistic quality as it explores the nuances 
of behavior. It is a risk-taking article, and a successful one. It is 
also usefully self-critical. 
For example, although Levmore might suggest that efficiency is 
arguably consistent with a given observed practice, he is clearly 
open to the possibility that the same claim of arguable efficiency 
might be made even if the opposite practice were dominant. 11 His 
tone cautions us to avoid the dangers of post hoc propter hoc, a far cry 
from the casual dealing with factual assumptions that characterized 
early law and economics claims for the efficiency of various legal 
rules. Perhaps we are moving into an era of data gathering, of 
specificity, of which Ronald Coase would finally approve. 12 
Thus, Levmore's article is useful not simply because of its 
content. Here we have a past master of traditional analytic law and 
economics venturing into Henry James territory-which is where we 
all really live. 13 That is an invitation to creativity and to observation 
of actual practice that many of us should be willing to engage. 
presentation, lively examples, and thought-provoking slants on issues previously taken 
for granted. In all these things, Levmore (as usual) excels. 
10 
"An Indian-born economist once explained his personal theory of reincarnation 
to his graduate economics class. 'If you are a good economist, a virtuous economist,' 
he said, 'you are reborn as a physicist. But if you are an evil, wicked economist, you 
are reborn as a sociologist.'" PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC 
SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED "EXPECTATIONS at xi (1994). 
The meaning of the joke depends on the audience. For most lawyer/ economists, 
the punchline depends on an assumed superiority of hard physics over soft social 
science. But Krugman argues that the Indian economist was "talking about 
something else entirely: the sheer difficulty of the subject. Economics is harder than 
physics; luckily it is not quite as hard as sociology." Id. 
11 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 1, at 2223-24. 
12 A primary burden of Coase's work has been to stress the importance of 
transaction costs and other data that can be determined only by observation. For an 
example, see R.H. COASE, The Lighthouse in Economics, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND 
THE LAW 187 (1988), where Professor Coase examines whether a classic economic 
assumption-that lighthouse services need to be provided by government-is consistent 
with the available facts. Professor Coase writes: 
I think we should try to develop generalizations which would give us 
guidance as to how various activities should best be organized and financed. 
But such generalizations are not likely to b'e helpful unless they are derived 
from studies of how such activities are actually carried out within different 
institutional frameworks. 
Id. at 211. 
15 For an exploration that contrasts the novelistic and utilitarian imaginations, see 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 
(1995). 
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II. MCADAMS ON THE DISCLOSURE AND DISCUSSION OF 
INFORMATION REGARDING NORM VIOLATION 
The primary concern of Richard McAdams's accomplished 
article is how law affects "the conditions under which members of 
close-knit groups can threaten to invoke certain norm sanctions, 
such as shame and reputational loss. "14 Given the current debates 
about liberalism and its goal of maintaining political neutrality 
among competing conceptions of the good, McAdams is right on 
the money in choosing to examine the impact of law on group 
norms in general-for such norms constitute, almost by definition, 
competing conceptions of the good.15 
Seen through the lens of liberalism, the torts of defamation 
and "false light" privacy can be seen as fairly sharp-edged tools 
for helping communities maintain accuracy of information about 
their members' norm compliance. 16 McAdams's chosen turf, 
however, is blackmail law, 17 the impact of which on primary group 
norms18 is much more controversial. 
14 McAdams, supra note 2, at 2291. 
15 This Comment will shortly turn to issues of commensurability. On the 
relationship between liberalism and commensurability, see, for example, infra note 
55 and accompanying text. 
16 The liberalism inquiry leads to several interesting ways to recast classic doctrinal 
issues within this branch of tort law. For example, courts differ on what descriptions 
or attributions are "defamatory" and thus actionable; to treat one description as 
actionable and to deny action for another is to distinguish between conceptions of the 
good. One conception is being respected, and one is being treated as trivial. 
17 Criminalizing blackmail means that the law forbids certain market transfers of 
information, yet permits free exchange (disclosure) of the information. Using 
Professor Radin's terms, blackmail criminalization makes embarrassing information 
partly "market-inalienable" insofar as the law restricts its sale but allows the 
information to be given away. See Margaret]. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1849, 1853 (1987). The market-inalienability is "partial" because although the 
law prohibits its sale to the person who wants the information to be kept silent, an 
information-holder is permitted to sell the information to other parties-notably, 
those who are unlikely to keep it secret, such as tabloid news media and the police. 
Laws that forbid sale but permit gifts and other nonmarket transfers have long 
been a topic of scholarship. The legal academy's investigation of the laws that 
criminalize blackmail (sale of information}, prostitution (sale of sex), and other 
inalienabilities took on a distinctly economic bent with the publication of Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972); for later explorations, see, 
for example, Gumo CAL\BRESI & PHILIP BOBBITI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); Radin, 
supra; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 931 (1985). 
18 To outline his argument, three categories of norms should be identified: 
primary norms of ordinary behavior (such as "do not cheat on tests" or "do not use 
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McAdams focuses on the impact that blackmail laws. have on the 
cost of gossip-in particular, whether the lawful availability of 
blackmail revenue would decrease the now fairly free exchange of 
jnformation ("gossip") about norm violation. He also examines 
whether norm internalization and norm critique and refinement-all 
of which may require public disclosures-are better served by 
blackmail's criminalization or by legalization. He argues that 
criminalization best serves groups' interests in encouraging 
disclosure and facilitating the internalization and reformation of 
primary norms.19 Conversely, McAdams suggests that the availabil-
ity of lawful blackmail would inhibit disclosure of norm violations, 
on the ground that the promise of earning money through black-
mail would work to dissuade the ordinary group member from 
freely disseminating any injurious information he happened to 
possess. 
McAdams's primary concern is whether the dynamics of 
behavior will lead toward, or away from, efficiency. In particular, 
he is interested in evaluating how outlawing blackmail-either 
commercial blackmail, which involves research into the victims' 
pasts or their peccadilloes, or opportunistic blackmail, which 
involves use of adventitiously acquired information-will affect 
efficient and inefficient small-group norms. 20 
Preliminarily, let me suggest that the usage of "efficiency" 
notions here is a bit strained.21 Efficiency ordinarily means the 
maximization of monetary value of goods or services, and policy-
more than your share of the common pasture"), norms of blackmail behavior (such 
as "do not blackmail" or perhaps "blackmailing is acceptable"), and norms of 
disclosure and nondisclosure (gossip versus privacy). (Note that McAdams does not 
discuss most of the variants on disclosure explored by Levmore.) 
19 He makes the argument that criminalization best serves the goals ofinternaliza-
tion and reformation of primary group norms in pa1·t because privacy norms correct 
for the tendency toward overdisclosure ("gossip" again) which he sees otherwise 
resulting from the blackmail prohibition. 
20 McAdams argues that blackmail's effect on the expected cost of norm violations 
is "ambiguous," but that criminalizing blackmail aids in the internalization and 
refinement of norms. See infra text following note 30. 
21 Professor Radin would probably classify this McAdams article as exhibiting an 
urge toward "universal commodification," because it seems to assume that "market 
theory itself, using a market failure analysis, can determine when things should not 
be bought and sold." Radin, supra note 17, at 1859. Professor McAdams undoubt-
edly would not want his analysis pressed so far as to evaluate everything in fungible 
efficiency terms; as Professor Radin herself notes, "[u]niversal commodification is an 
archetype, a caricature" that even economic analysts do not fully embrace. Id. at 
1862. 
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makers who consider economics a useful criterion of social welfare 
usually do so because monetary value provides an objective measure 
(albeit highly inexact) of utility. Efficiency makes a great deal of 
sense as a criterion for judging commercial norms (for example, 
among diamond merchants22) or norms of land use (for example, 
among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County23). Its usefulness, 
however, diminishes sharply when moving to norms governing less 
quantifiable behavior, in particular, behavior that we ordinarily 
judge less by its ability to produce satisfaction ("utility"24) than by its 
moral status.25 Not all of us are Benthamites who believe that 
moral norms are simply codes through which utility expresses itself. 
As Cass Sunstein points out, some norms have to do with the 
kind of persons we want to become and the kinds of preferences we 
want to have. 26 A norm can be desired, respected, and valued by 
virtually all members of a community even if the norm fails to 
maximize either .monetary value or emotions of utility satisfaction. 
It is possible that McAdams's analysis could apply to norms that 
have nothing to do with utility or money. That is, if his analysis 
were internally powerful, it might tell us something useful about 
disclosure of norm violations, internalization of norms, and 
refinement of norms, even if those norms were desired for reasons 
other than efficiency. But is his analysis persuasive? In some 
aspects, yes, particularly in regard to some of the connections he 
explores between blackmail law and privacy norms.27 Nevertheless, 
key segments falter precisely because he fails to note that some 
norms can trump both money and utility. 
22 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
23 See ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 15-120 (1991). 
24 
"Utility" is the criterion often employed by those ethicists who view all values 
as commensurable. For discussions highlighting some intriguing issues of com-
mensurability, see, for example, Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurabilily, 
43 DUKE LJ. 56 (1993); Radin, supra note 17; Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and 
Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 785 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). 
25 CJ. infra note 48 (discussing the distinction between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft). 
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2029-33 (1996) (noting that the community may embrace norms that encourage 
desired preferences). 
27 The connection with privacy norms is explored in Part II ofMcAdams's article. 
See McAdams, supra note 2, at 2266-91. My critique focuses primarily on Part I of 
that article. 
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McAdams's analysis depends in significant part on predictions 
he makes about which norms will evolve for or against committing 
blackmail. Yet he skims over the concept of "honor, "28 itself a 
norm, which will keep many people from considering as possible 
revenue the money they could reap from committing blackmail. 
Rather, he makes a large assumption: that legalizing blackmail will 
have only one large effect on norms, and that will be toward making 
blackmail a more socially acceptable activity. He realizes blackmail 
is currently considered unsavory, but his argument suggests that if 
blackmail were legalized, the number of people engaged in it would 
increase sharply. Apparently it would become no more a subject of 
social opprobrium than hard bargaining or being a slumlord. He 
assumes-and this is key-that all people will routinely include in 
their utility calculations the likely payoff from committing black-
mail. 29 
The latter is the concealed centerpiece of much of his analysis: 
that after the legalization of blackmail, everyone-not just the bad 
apples who might go into the business of commercial blackmail-will 
be willing to blackmail if the price is right.30 Gossip, the free 
exchange of information within groups, will decrease, and persons 
who accidentally acquire evidence of norm violation will have an 
incentive to keep the evidence concealed. If this happens, 
McAdams argues, there will be two categories of effect. 
(1) Members of groups will increasingly engage in blackmail 
rather than disclose instances of norm violation, which will (a) 
have an indeterminate effect on the cost of norm violation and 
more definitely (b) reduce the visibility of norm violations and 
thus reduce opportunities for public education and norm 
internalization; and 
(2) group members will decrease their involvement in criticizing 
and refining norms, since narrowing the group's norms might 
deprive group members of potential blackmail revenues. 
Are these outcomes likely? 
The strongest effect of legalizing blackmail will be the creation 
of commercial blackmail firms, like Richard Epstein's hypothesized 
28 McAdams does, however, suggest interestingly that honor is often eroded by 
rationalization. See id. at 2262 n.72. 
29 See id. at 2246, 2260, 2283-84. 
so Of course, McAdams does not contend that everyone will blackmail; at any 
given "reward" for blackmailing, only those at the margin will be affected . 
• 
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Blackmail, lnc.,31 whose business will be digging up dirt. The 
existence of commercial blackmailers-the slumlords of inf orma-
tion-could mean that everyone with money would be subjected to 
the garbage-sorting scrutiny that today only celebrities must bear. 
If blackmail were legal, many disclosures of norm violation 
would result as fallout from the blackmail business-such as 
accidental disclosures, disclosures made to establish "credibility,"32 
and disclosures made when blackmail payments are not offered in 
satisfactory amounts. My guess38 is that the disclosure-increasing 
impact of allowing commercial blackmail will outweigh the disclo-
sure-decreasing impact of allowing opportunistic blackmail. 
If so, legalizing blackmail will increase the likelihood of norm 
violations being disclosed and punished by social opprobrium, with 
the consequent educational and internalization effects. Thus, the 
net effect of allowing commercial blackmail is likely to be an increase 
in the very effects McAdams thinks legalization would inhibit.34 
If we turn our attention from commercial to opportunistic 
blackmail, we first note that possessors of casual information are 
more likely to be friends than strangers.35 Thus, its practitioners 
are more likely to be group members in good standing rather than 
staffers of Blackmail, Inc. If so, are ordinary group members really 
likely to take the possible profits from blackmail into account? 
McAdams himself notes that norms tend to be weakest when the 
violators are acting on "victims outside their social groups. "36 
Speaking as a matter of observation, most people do not engage in 
31 See Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983). 
32 Commentators have long argued that blackmailers will need to disclose 
occasionally, in order to demonstrate the sincerity of their threats. See, e.g., Wendy 
J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1741, 1751 (1993) (describing such a motivation as an "affirmative and 
independent motive[] to disclose"). 
33 Note my use of the word "guess." Neither McAdams nor I am predicting; real 
prediction requires an extensive knowledge base. We are engaging in conjecture, and 
there is a risk that the very elaborateness of McAdams's analysis may lend it a 
seeming reliability that even he would not claim. 
34 In my view, allowing commercial blackmail would also lead to an increase in the 
cost of norm violation. McAdams is agnostic on whether legalization will increase the 
cost of violating norms. 
35 Admittedly, strangers such as hotel clerks and credit-card staff also have access 
to a great deal of information about each of us, but employer confidentiality codes 
restrain credit-card account clerks and the like. Thus, independent of blackmail bans 
these businesspeople have an incentive to keep the information private: their desire 
to keep their jobs, and our custom. 
si; McAdams, supra note 2, at 2245 n.24 (discussing property crimes). 
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hard bargaining within their own social set over noncommercial 
matters even where such behavior is lawful. This observation hardly 
suggests that a significant increase in intragroup blackmail will 
follow from legalization. Nor are people who play status-games 
through disclosing others' norm violations37 likely to see monetary 
payments as commensurable with the gains that gossip gives them. 
It is even less plausible that high-status people-those most likely 
to be persuasive norm critics-will stop criticizing norms, simply 
because they hope that overbroad norms will entrap the unwary and 
thus bring these same high-status folk blackmail revenues. ss Here 
McAdams also understates the reciprocity that exists among a 
group's members. One day's blackmailer may be the next day's 
victim. Failing to engage in criticism and refinement of overbroad 
norms can entrap many an unwary hypocrite. 
To repeat: it is mere speculation that blackmail norms will alter 
by legalization to a degree sufficient to make the average person 
willing to consider blackmail a real source of revenue. Think, for 
example, of whether the legality of the matchmaking business would 
lead you to charge two friends a finder's fee (unless matchmaking 
were your business) for bringing them together. The mere 
introduction of money into the social context is likely to be seen as 
an insult.39 McAdams overstates when he claims that "[a]nti-
blackmail norms are essentially the same as disclosure norms."40 
Blackmail involves commodification, while disclosure by social 
group members usually does not. 
James Boyle goes so far as to maintain that commodification is 
central to blackmail's criminalization: "[B]lackmail prevents the 
commodification of silence about private information partly because 
of a romantic notion of privacy, home, and hearth and an associated 
belief that we must keep the market away from that realm if we 
hope to maintain it[.]"41 This is closely connected to a point 
McAdams makes, that criminalizing blackmail helps to maintain a 
37 McAdams is, of course, quite aware of the role that status competition can play. 
See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995). 
38 McAdams writes: "The possibility for blackmail creates an expectation of profits 
from blackmailing others after discovering their norm violations. The profits create 
an opportunity cost to reforming inefficient norms." McAdams, supra note 2, at 
2260. 
39 See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 787. 
•
0 McAdams, supra note 2, at 2284 n.126. 
•
1 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIE1Y 79 (1996). 
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structure where nonmarket norms (of privacy) can dominate.42 It 
is ironic that McAdams fails to take sufficient account of the effect 
that antimarket norms can have on behavior. 
The antiblackmail norm is likely to be stable after legalization 
for yet another reason. Informational blackmail, whether commer-
cial or opportunistic, entails profiting by a norm violation or by 
some painful experience that the victim would pref er to conceal. It 
is hard to imagine any group that would approve of someone 
profiting by means of another's violating the group's own norms.43 
(At least, such approval is hard to imagine short of the special 
circumstances and socialization that permits criminal lawyers to view 
their tasks as honorable even when defending the guilty.) For this 
and related reasons, most people do not consider blackmail among 
their options for reasons that appear (to me at least) moral, a matter 
of character, and largely unrelated to illegality. 
It strikes me as an obvious human trait-a matter of internal 
consistency-to have distaste not only for acts that violate one's 
norms (whatever the specific norms might be) but also for acts that 
profit from that violation, especially if the profit comes from 
covering up the violation. Incentives may also help to explain this 
trait. Crime annals suggest that would-be blackmailers hone tools 
of temptation and entrapment; if so, legalizing blackmail might 
increase the incidence of norm violation as people fall into 
blackmailers' traps. Another p·art of the distaste is symbolic: 
upholding the underlying norm by frowning on those who profit by 
its violation.44 Further, as I have argued elsewhere at some length, 
blackmail violates principles of equality through the infliction of an 
unjustified injury, and as such is a deontologic wrong.45 This, too, 
42 See McAdams, supra note 2, at 2282-83. 
45 CJ. Leviticus 19:16 ("Do not profit by the blood of your neighbor."), available in 
THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 896 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981); Leviticus 
19:17 ("Reprove your neighbor, but incur no guilt because of him."), available in THE 
TORAH, supra, at 896. Although this translation is only one of many possible variants, 
it captures familiar moral sentiments. 
44 CJ. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 2024 (examining "the function of the law in 
'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly"). 
45 This is discussed at length in Gordon, supra note 32, at 1758-75 (arguing that, 
from the deontologic perspective, commercial blackmail constitutes an unjustified 
intentional infliction of harm for the blackmailer's personal benefit). 
In the case of opportunistic blackmail, however, whether the blackmailer causes 
injury is contestable. Compare opportunistic blackmail with the commercial 
blackmail case, using the definition of harm I have proposed: A transaction is 
harmful or injurious if 
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is likely to give stability to the antiblackmail social norm even in the 
face of blackmail legalization.46 But only empirical investigation 
can determine if this supposition is correct. 
The realm of norm enforcement is layers more complex than 
McAdams's article suggests. His intricate rational choice structure 
is built on a paucity of factors that fails to capture the most 
important features of how humans make decisions in morally 
charged settings. 47 Also, it is instructive to compare his approach 
(1) the thing the seller wants the buyer/victim to purchase is such that the 
buyer would be better off, in regard to that thing, if the seller and his 
resources did not exist, 
(2) the buyer/victim would be better off if the transaction were impossible 
and known by all parties to be impossible, and 
(3) the buyer/victim has done nothing to the other party that would give 
that party a corrective justice right against her. 
Id. at 1772 (footnotes omitted). 
If selling silence were impossible, the commercial blackmailer would never 
have bothered to research the negative information. Thus, the commercial 
blackmailer clearly proposes an injurious transaction. By contrast, regard-
ing information accidentally acquired, a victim might indeed be worse off if money-
for-silence transactions were impossible-after all, the opportunistic black-
mailer's acquisition of the information did not depend upon the hope of a blackmail 
payment. 
46 It is also possible that, instead of eroding antiblackmail norms, legalizing 
blackmail will strengthen those norms by increasing the psychic rewards for norm 
compliance and the social opprobrium for norm noncompliance. Although this 
seems unlikely, consider in this regard the argument Landes and Posner have made 
for not imposing a duty to rescue: that moral claims are stronger, and social rewards 
like praise are greater, when persons do creditable things beyond what the law requires 
them to do. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good 
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 83, 93-100 (1978) (suggesting that monetary incentives would reduce rather 
than increase overall incentives toward heroism). 
47 Admittedly, any social science abstracts from reality and eliminates some factors 
to concentrate on others. The issue is whether the most useful factors are preserved, 
and whether the assumptions that are made about those factors are close enough to 
reality to provide useful approximations. 
McAdams's transaction-cost analysis is also flawed. Although he is of course 
correct in asserting that many affected third parties are not in a position to bargain 
with potential blackmailers, he is mistaken in asserting that, in a world without 
transaction costs, the market would "solve" the blackmail problem in a way 
guaranteed to maximize utility. Compare his treatment with Gordon, supra note 32, 
at 1754-57 (discussing the impact of wealth effects when reputation is at issue). To 
the extent that someone feels that her good reputation or other characteristic is 
"priceless," the more likely it is that the price she would demand to sell the 
characteristic will be almost infinite-and thus (assuming the individual is not a 
billionaire) will greatly exceed the price she could afford to pay for the characteristic 
if the law failed to give her an entitlement to it. See id. 
Thus, the so-called wealth effect or "ask/offer phenomenon" can be seen as 
expressing an aspect of incommensurability. A similar point is made by Sunstein, 
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with work that examines specific and actual small groups, like the 
work of Robert Ellickson and Lisa Bernstein. It is exceedingly 
difficult to attempt generalizations, as McAdams does, about an 
abstract small group. 48 But in the process McAdams does bring a 
host of useful questions to the fore, and has provided a useful 
platform for future research. 
A caveat is also in order regarding McAdams's assumption that 
the law of blackmail reveals a great deal about the law's general 
attitude toward nonlegal norms. Note that although gossip helps in 
the enforcement of nonlegal norms, it also helps in the enforcement 
of legal rules; rumor often helps to identify the perpetrator of a 
crime. Therefore, even if blackmail prohibitions are constructed in 
part to induce certain information disclosure via gossip, the 
information may be more important for the law's own maintenance 
than for the enforcement, articulation, and reformation of nonlegal 
norms. 
To resolve this question, it would be necessary, inter alia, 
to examine the legislative history of the blackmail statutes to see 
why they fail to distinguish between those "occasions of ridicule or 
shame" that are caused by violations of nonlegal norms and those 
that are caused by violations of law. My suspicion is that the 
primary explanation lies not with a desire to uphold small 
group norms, but rather with administrative convenience, and a 
desire to avoid the violence to which blackmail victims might be 
prone. 
III. AN EXAMPLE 
One problem with the McAdams article is the dearth of specific 
examples. Let me therefore borrow an example from Levmore. It 
can be used to illustrate the actual complexity of the behavior 
involved and to examine the plausibility of McAdams's implicit 
supra note 24, at 839-40. 
48 Focusing on hypothesized generic small groups, as McAdams does, provides 
some ;malytic advantages. Nevertheless, such a generic approach inevitably has its 
costs, obscuring for example the differences between Gemeinschaft-like groups (organic 
traditional communities and intimate groups like the family) and those that are 
Gesellschaft-like (impersonal, arms-length associations such as commercial concerns). 
a set of distinctions that played a strong role in early twentieth-century sociology. See 
FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIE.TY (C.P. Loomis ed. & trans., Michigan 
State Univ. Press 1957) (originally published as GE.ME.INSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 
(1887)). 
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claim that, if blackmail were legalized, the likelihood of blackmail 
revenues would be taken into account by all actors. 
Levmore describes a situation in which one social guest watches 
another social guest slip one of the host's valuable knick-knacks into 
a pocket. The watching guest thinks this is probably an act of 
theft-undoubtedly a norm violation. His question is, what to do? 
Speaking to the host directly might alienate the host, and might 
even cast suspicion on the speaker as the person really responsible 
for the missing item. Speaking to the full-pocketed guest might 
create justified anger-"What do you mean, spying on me? This 
knick-knack happens to be something I lent the host last year, which 
he left out on the table so I wouldn't forget to take it home with 
me" -and would certainly create a scene. 
It is hard to imagine that this awkward scenario would change 
in any way were blackmail legal. What is our protagonist-the 
watching guest-concerned with? He is concerned with upholding 
norms, protecting feelings, and safeguarding his own standing and 
respect among peers. Although rewards are certainly lawful, he is 
not thinking of the reward money he could earn by turning in the 
other guest. Why would making blackmail lawful make him 
consider selling his silence to the pilfering guest? 
McAdams makes clear the central point about inalienability: by 
forbidding information-holders from exchanging their disclosure-
potential for money, it requires those persons to resolve their 
decisions about disclosure according to nonmonetary norms.49 But 
I doubt that one needs to outlaw money-for-silence transactions in 
order to make this happen. Michael Walzer has suggested that our 
social and legal worlds are subdivided into many spheres, and that 
within each sphere different criteria govern.50 An important part 
of our childhood social conditioning constitutes training in how to 
keep the various spheres separate-so that, for example, we do not 
sell our honor for a cookie or for a promise to "be your best 
49 See Radin, supra note 17, at 1855. Thus, to the extent society views a certain 
good or characteristic as nonfungible, its perceived incommensurability can be 
safeguarded by prohibiting its possessor to exchange the good for money. (Dollar 
bills are, of course, the ultimate in fungibility.) Barred from the market, an individual 
will then have to make decisions on the basis of nonmonetary values thought to be 
more appropriate. Thus, McAdams usefully points out a blackmail ban can help free 
a space for nonmonetary privacy norms to operate. 
50 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY (1983). On inalienability and incommensurability, see Radin, supra note 
24; Radin, supra note 17; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17; Schauer, supra note 24; 
Sunstein, supra note 24. 
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friend." McAdams needs to explain why merely making it lawful to 
extract blackmail payments, and inserting that fact into Levmore's 
guest/host example, would change the nature of the protagonist's 
concerns, or our views that money should not be relevant to 
friendship. The burden is on McAdams to make this showing if he 
wishes to be persuasive: because most of us learn that it is ignoble 
to transform social relations into money, after childhood the norm 
largely self-polic~s. Nevertheless, McAdams has usefully begun the 
inquiry into whether the legal system assists in this boundary 
maintenance. 
CONCLUSION 
Economists are accustomed to working with narrow sets of 
assumptions, with rational actors so minimally described that even 
gymnasts might envy the way they are stripped for action. This 
methodology, often fruitful precisely because its models' simple 
assumptions allow complex results to be derived, depends among 
other things on commensurability: that all goods and all values can 
be measured by some common yardstick.51 The assumption is that 
humap. rationality can sort all choices by some overriding algorithm. 
Yet some choices may be incapable of being so resolved. 52 
This is not necessarily a defect in rationality.53 Even within the 
most rational of us, many sources and types of values compete for 
our allegiance.54 But as lawyers we are committed to the public 
sphere, and in that sphere decisions must be made and accountabil-
ity assessed. We therefore may be prone to thinking that because 
the use of consistent criteria is desirable in principled public deci-
sionmaking, it is necessary to all private decisionmaking as well.55 
51 The yardstick utilized by most economists is, of course, "willingness to pay." 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (4th ed. 1992). 
52 The worst of these we refer to as "tragic." Bernard Williams defines tragic 
choices as those where "an agent can justifiably think that whatever he does will be 
wrong... BERNARD WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Value, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 1973-1980, at 71, 74 (1981}; see also CALABRESI 8c BOBBITf, supra note 17, in 
which judge Calabresi shows the instability of criteria that can result when inevitable 
but insupportable choices must be made. 
" Williams argues that "it must be a mistake to regard a need to eliminate conflict 
as a purely rational demand." WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 81. 
54 See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979) (discussing "some 
problems created by a disparity between the fragmentation of value and the single-
ness of decision"). 
55 Williams argues: 
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That would be an error, at least if the kind of consistency expected 
is of the algorithmic type. 
If not all goods and values are commensurable with money, that 
suggests that increasing the amount of money attached to a given 
behavior will not always generate a significant increase in the 
behavior.56 Thus, for example, even if blackmail were lawful, many 
persons might be unwilling to trade off their sense of honor for a 
chance at blackmail revenues. Of course, some might do so-but the 
issue is whether the shift in behavior is likely to occur frequently 
enough that the law should take note of it. 
What do I mean by claiming that our morality has several, non-
commensurable strains within it? The simplest illustration is, 
admittedly, a bit extreme, but for the sake of clarity, let us use it: 
the conundrum of the evil deity, famously posed by one Karamazov 
brother to another.57 Assume a deity exists that has the power to 
free the world from war and all sorts of evil;. this deity can bring on 
a time of peace, health, and plenty in which no one-least of all chil-
dren-would ever again suffer. But further assume that this deity is 
perverse and demands as the price of this world-wide transforma-
tion that you (yes you, personally) torture a designated small child 
to death. Would you do it? 
Part of you probably feels horrified. To that part of you, it is 
paramountly clear that the child is morally entitled to be free of 
your torture. Yet you also know that as a result of your reluctance, 
other children-hundreds and thousands of children this year, then 
[S]ome new accord must be found between private understanding, which 
can live with a good deal of 'intuition' and unresolved conflict, and the 
public order, which, unless we are to give up the ethical ambition that it be 
answerable, can only live with less .••• 
[I]f philosophy is to understand the relations between conflict and 
rationalisation in the modern world, it should look towards an equilibrium-
one to be achieved in practice-between private and public. 
WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 82. 
. Arguably, that is the role of liberalism: to allow competing conceptions of the 
good to coexist with government. But of course, the relationship among commensu-
rability, commodification, and liberalism is quite contested. Compare, e.g., FREIDRICH 
A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 56-71 (1944) with Radin, supra note 17, at 1887. 
56 In fact, a growing body of psychological data suggests that extrinsic rewards 
such as money can even discourage valuable behaviors, by damping the intrinsic sense 
of satisfaction that often motivates the best work. See generally ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED 
BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD STARS, INCENTIVE PLANS, A'S, PRAISE, AND 
OTHER BRIBES (1993) (summarizing the psychological literature from this perspective). 
57 See FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 226 (Ralph E. Matlaw 
ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1976) (1880). 
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millions more children as the years roll by-will suffer as bombs fall, 
illnesses spread, and abusive relatives batter. All this pain could be 
obviated by one day's horrible act by you. So another part of you 
may feel morally obligated to torture the child today in order to 
obtain freedom from torture for all children for all time in the 
future.58 
Ethicists usually use the term "deontologic" to refer to that 
component of your moral thinking that will have nothing to do with 
causing pain to the child. . This part of your moral self sees the 
individual child as an end in herself.59 A deontologist obeys rules 
whose content does not vary with consequences. 60 
By contrast, ethicists usually use the term "consequentialist" or 
"utilitarian" to refer to that component of your moral thi~king that 
does care about how many people will be injured. This part of your 
moral self cares more about what eventuates than about how an end 
is achieved. 61 It is the consequentialistic component of your moral 
thinking that feels obligated to procure the world its universal 
happiness even if it means torturing a child and damning your own 
self.62 
How can a single individual hold such divergent views? One 
part of the answer is surely our ability to visualize differing images 
sequentially: our allegiance undoubtedly shifts as our mental 
attention focuses first on one aspect of the scene (this child), then 
on another (my act), and finally on another (the welfare of tomor-
58 lfyou do not yet feel torn, consider the added twists to the conscience posed 
by JOHN FOWLES, THE MAGUS 430-35 (rev'd ed. 1977) or by URSULA K. LE GUIN, The 
Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, in THE WIND'S TWELVE QUARTERS 224 (1975). 
59 Similarly, many religious views see "a world in each individual." Note that a 
deontologist may care about both the child and the others affected; there can be 
incommensurability within a given moral view in addition to the incommensurability 
that can result from having allegiance to more than one moral view. 
60 This part of your moral self also cares about how things happen: that you do 
evil matters as a moral fact in itself. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 
165-88 (1986). 
61 See id. 
62 In a Borges story, the possibility is raised that the true savior is Judas because 
Judas, in order to carry out the prophecy, does something that causes him to be 
eternally damned-surely a greater sacrifice than allowing one's self to be crucified. 
See JORGE LUIS BORGES, Three Versions of Judas, in LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES & 
OTHER WRITINGS 95 (Donald A. Yates &James E. Irby eds., 1964). Of course, part 
of the paradox here is the puzzle of how a true sacrifice could warrant damnation: 
the answers are at least two-that the deity is perverse, as posited in The Brothers 
Karamazov, or that there can indeed be situations, as Williams claims, in which there 
is nothing one can do which would be right. See supra note 52 (discussing tragic 
choices). 
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row's generations). I would hardly be the first to sugges.t that as 
humans we define ourselves in part by choosing the one vision we 
find most persuasive (or most vivid or most moving) from among 
the many narratives within caliing dis~nce of our empathy. 
As Roger Shattuck notes: 
Walt Whitman lived at peace with the fact that he contradicted 
himself. He said that he contained multitudes. Proust asks the 
next question. How much of his multitudinous self can a person 
be or embody at one time? . . . No matter how we go about it we 
cannot be all of ourselves all at once. Narrow light beams of percep-
tion and of recollection illuminate the present and the past in 
vivid fragments. . . . [T]o summon our entire self into simulta-
neous existence lies beyond our powers. We live by synechdoche, 
by cycles ofbeing.63 
Although we may live by synecdoche, we nevertheless try to 
11?-ake social decisions by some relatively consistent vision, and to 
pre-announce shifts in the rules of the game when our public 
criteria alter. And, truth be told, I have yet some hope of working 
out a guide for my own rocky choices am_ong seemingly incommen-
surable values. But no matter how utilitarian my own personal 
algorithm turns out to be, I am sure that in some areas cons.equen-
tialism would not rule. 
Social science always involves approximation, and one salutary 
effect of studying norms should be to increase our knowledge of 
where it is dangerous-even as an assumption-to treat the bulk of 
personal decisionmaking as commercially motivated. In realms 
where nonmonetary and antimonetary norms play a strong role, it 
is not the best use of scholarly energy to assume that a law which 
alters -monetary payoffs will necessarily have significant behavioral 
effects. In such realms, it is certainly possible that the monetary 
changes will alter behavior, but the degree of such impact should be 
investigated empirically. 
65 ROGER SHATIUCK, MARCEL PROUST 5-6 (1974). 

